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The Limits of Cross-Examination
Richard H. Underwoodt
Credibility. noun. The quality said to be possessed by one who is obviously
lying, but whose views correspond with those of the listener.!
[Cross-examination: noun.] ... [The most powerful instrument known
to the law in eliciting truth.'
I. The History and Mythology
of Cross-Examination
The system is as old as the history of nations. Indeed, to this day, the
account given by Plato of Socrates's cross-examination of his accuser,
Miletus [sic], while defending himself against the capital charge of
corrupting the youth of Athens, may be quoted as a masterpiece in the
art of cross-questioning.'
Francis Wellman's allusion is to The Apology, which reports the trial
of Socrates.' In the course of his opening statement, Socrates complained
of an inability to confront certain of his accusers.5 In fact, cross-examination
does seem to have been somewhat limited in Athenian law courts.6 More-
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This Article is one in a continuing series, whiich will comprise chapters of a book styled FALSE
WrrNEss: THE LAW AND LoRE OF PERjuRY AND OTHER FORENSIC MISCONDUCT.
1. PATRICK ScRIVENoR, EGG ON YOUR INERFACE: ADiCIIONARYOFMODERNNONSENSE
61(1989).
2. 5 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 1362, at 4 n. 1 (Chadboum rev. 1970).
3. FRANCIS WELLMAN, THE ART OF CROSS-EXAMINAION 27 (1903).
4. SeeF.J.CHUCH(TRANS. ),HETalALANDDEATHoFSOCRAS(19og,R-W.liviNGSTONE,
PORTRArr OF SOCRATES (1963).
5. See CHURCH, supra note 4, at 37-38.
6. ROBERT J. BONNER, LAWYERS AND LmGANTs IN ANcIENT ATHENS: THE GENESIS OF
THE LEGAL PROFESSION 51-52, 67, 185 (1927).
HeinOnline  -- 21 Am. J. Trial Advoc. 113 1997-1998
AMERICAN JOURNAL OF TRIAL ADVOCACY
over, Socrates complained that his accusers past and present were many
and in many cases anonymous: "I cannot call any one of them to Court,
to cross-examine him; I have, as it were, simply to fight with shadows in
my defence, and to put questions which there is no one to answer."7
Nevertheless, one of his chief accusers, Meletus, was present and took
the bait.' Socrates was allowed to cross-examine him with leading questions,
accompanied by large doses of comment or argument.9 As I.F. Stone put
it, Socrates "trap[ped] the rather dim-witted Meletus [spokesman for the
poets] into accusing [Socrates] of atheism, a charge he easily refut[ed]."'"
Not that it did Socrates much good in the end, mind you. This is one of
the most important things to learn about the limits of cross-examination.
You can carry on brilliantly and still lose your case. 1 But I am getting
ahead of my story.
Some time during the Babylonian Captivity witness proof and cross-
examination must have stood alongside, if not superseded, the test of the
bitter waters. 12 According to the story in Daniel 13:1-43,3 the two lecherous
elders who falsely accused Susanna of fornication were foiled not by the
7. See CHURCH, supra note 4, at 37-38; LIVINGSTONE, supra note 4, at 5.
8. CHURCH, supra note 4, at 47-54; LIvINGSTONE, supra note 4, at 17-21.
9. CHURCH, supra note 4, at 47-54; LrVINGsTONE, supra note 4, at 17-21.
10. ISADOR F. STONE, THE TRIAL OF SocRATEs 199 (1989).
11. See Jerry Giesler, THE JERRY GIESLER STORY (1960) reprinted in ARNOLD WOLF, CROSS-
EXAMINATION oNTRIAL 16-19 (1988). Wolf observes, "it should be noted-end this is a sobering
thought-that despite Giesler's obtaining... exculpatory admissions from the kidnap victim
and his devastating cross-examination of the kidnapper who'd made a deal [to give State's evidence],
the jury convicted [the defendant]." Id. at 19. Finley Peter Dunne's Mr. Dooley put it even
better when he commented on how the best pals of homo advocatus can be upset by the bias
and irrationality ofjurors: "Whin the case is all over, the jury'l pitch th' testimony out th' window,
an' consider three questions: Did Lootgert look as though he'd kill his wife? Did his wife look
as though she ought to be kilt? Isn't it time we wint to supper?" Mr. Dooley in War and Peace,
quoted in Louis HELLER, Do You SoLEMNLY SWEAR? 88 (1968).
Say it ain't so, O.J.!
12. This is a form of trial by ordeal described in the Bible. Numbers 5:11-31. See Richard
Underwood, Truth Verifiers: From the Hot Iron to the Lie Detector, 84 KY. L.J. 597, 611-14
(1995-96).
13. Daniel 13:1-43, THEOxFORDANNOTATEDBmLE(1962). The story ofDaniel and Susanna
is an apocryphal account and as such is not contained in the traditional Christian Bible but only
in an Apocrypha edition.
[Vol. 21:113
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ordeal, nor by the side-show tactics of Hyperides 4 Instead her savior
"move[d] for the Rule"" and nailed the bad guys on "cross."
And Daniel said to then, "Separate them far from each other, and I will
examine them."... When they were separated from each other, he
summoned one of them and said to him... "Now then if you really saw
her, tell me this: Under what tree did you see them being intimate with
each other?" He answered, "Under a mastic tree."... Then he put him
aside, and commanded them to bring the other. And he said to him, ...
"Now then, tell me: Under what tree did you catch them being intimate
with each other?" He answered, "Under an evergreen oak."... Then
all the assembly shouted loudly and blessed God, who saves those who
hope in him. And they rose against the two elders, for out of their own
mouths Daniel had convicted them of bearing false witness; and they
did to them as they had wickedly planned to do to their neighbor, acting
in accordance with the law of Moses [Deuteronomy 19:16-21], they put
them to death. Thus innocent blood was saved that day. 6
Eventually, confrontation and cross-examination came to be the signal
feature of the common law trial." The hapless Sir Walter Raleigh's words
echoed those of Socrates: "The Proof of the Common Law is by witness
and jury: let Cobham be here, let him speak it. Call my accuser before my
face, and I have done."18 He was heard by later generations, at least. With
the appearance of the jury trial as we know it today came other true-life
cases"' in which false witnesses were broken on the wheel of cross-examina
14. Hyperides was the lawyer for the courtesan Phyme, who had been accused of profaning
the Eleusinian mysteries. At a particularly desperate moment, Hyperides stripped her to her
birthday suit and implored the jurors to gaze upon and have pity on a priestess ofAphrodite--always
a winning argument Not guilty! See Richard Underwood, Logic and the Common Law Trial,
18 AM. J. TRIALADvoc. 151, 160-61 (1994).
15. 'Moved for the Rule" is the expression in myneck ofthe woods used to request a separation
of witnesses. See also CHARLES R. HOU..EY, TRIAL OF A CIVI. LAwsurr 11 (Supp. 1993) (in
Florida practice, "invoking the rule").
16. Daniel 13:51-62, THE OXFORD ANNOTATED BIBLE (1962).
17. IRVING YOUNGER, HEARSAY: A PRACTICAL GUIDE THROUGH THE THICKET 2 (1988).
18. 2 T.B. HowEa., STATE TRIAS 15-16 (1816, see also Richard Underwood, A Perjury:
An Anthology, 13 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 307, 318-21 (1996) (discussing Raleigh's case).
In Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1016, 108 S. Ct. 2798, 2800-01, 101 L. Ed. 2d 857, 864 (1988),
the Justices debated the relevance of these words from WILL.Am SHAKESPEARE, RICHARD II act
I sc. 1: "Then call them to our presence-face to face, and frowning brow to brow, ourselves
will hear the accuser and the accused freely speak .... DANIEL KORNSTEIN, KILL ALL THE
LAWYERS?: SHAKESPEARE'S LEGALAPPEAL 193-94 (1994).
19. The following are collections of famous cross-examinations, including those which we
would refer to as destructive cross-examinations. See WFJ.mAN, supra note 3; ASHER L.
1997]
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tion. There have been other Daniels, such as Daniel O'Connell, the legendary
Irish advocate:
"I left Cork yesterday evening at five o'clock and rode all night, ninety
long miles, to see your honor [said the prisoners' messenger to O'Connell].
The friends of the poor boys who are in the dock for the Doneraile
conspiracy sent me to you, and unless you are in Cork before the court
opens every man of them will be hanged, though as innocent as the child
unborn."... The judges were asked to postpone the hearing, which was
refused, [Baron] Pennefather declaring "the trial should proceed without
delay." Scouts were placed along Killarney Road, but no news came.
The jury was sworn, and the Solicitor General had begun to address the
jury when a loud, increasing volume of cheers arose and swept towards
the court house. It was not possible to hear anything but the shouts of
the people. "The counselor is coming!" How he took his seat at the bar
in his traveling robes; how he munched sandwiches and supped a bowl
of milk whilst he corrected the Solicitor General's law between each
mouthful; how he bantered and bullied the crown witnesses; and how
Nowlan, the most infamous of them, broke down in his lies and howled
in his agony: "Wisha the God knows, 'tis little I thought I would meet
you here to-day, Counselor O'Connell. May the Lord save me from youl"
-these things are all faithfully recorded in the chronicles of the trial.
20
CORNEiUs, THE CROSS-EXAMINAION OF WrrNEssEs (1929); RICHARD DuCANN, THE ART OF
THE ADVOCATE (1964, JAKE ERHIC-, THE LOST ART OF CROSS-EXAMINATION (1970); WOLF,
supra note 11; PETER M. BROWN, THE ART OF QUESTIONING: THIRTY MAXIMS OF CROSS-
EXAMINATION (1988).
The following offer instructive hypothetical cromss-examinations. See JULEs H BAER & SIMON
BAuCER, CROSS-EXAMINATION AND SUMMATION (2d ed. 1948); MICHAEL TIGAR, ExAMWING
WrrNEsSES (1993).
20. WELLMAN, supra note 3, at 226. For another bit of"O'Connellia" see M'Garahan
v. Maguire [from MONGAN, CELEBRATEDTRIALS INIRELND (1827), reprintedin JOHNR WIGMORE,
PRINCIPLES OFJUDICIALPROOF 596 (2d ed. 1931)]. A priest was charged with seduction. O'Connell
proved that it was really a case of blackmail by the victim's family-they had been offered L600
to prosecute. Here are excerpts from the cross-examination of Anne M'Garahan, the "victim":
O'Connell: Did you ever take a false oath about the business?
Witness: Not that I recollect.
O'Conncll: Great God, is that a thing you could have forgotten?
Witness: I believe I did not. I am sure I did not.
O'Connell: Oh, I see I have wound you up. Perhaps, then, you will tell me now,
did you ever swear it was false?
Witness: I never took an oath that the charge against Mr. Maguire was false. I
might have said it, but I never did swear it.
O'Connell: Did you ever say that your family was offered L500 or L600 for prosecut-
ing Mr. Maguire?
Witness: I don't recollect.
O'Connell: Did you ever say that you would get L600 for prosecuting him?
[Vol. 21:113
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The older handbooks on advocacy frequently allude to the almost
supernatural power of the experienced trial lawyer-the power to confront
and break the false witness. While generally advising counsel to make haste
slowly and not reveal counsel's suspicions,2 all in the hope of trapping
the liar, James Ram wrote that some witnesses might be broken rather quickly
by a confrontational style:
If he is one of that numerous class who have merely got up a story to
which they doggedly adhere, it may be wise to awe him at once, by notice
that you do not believe him, and that you do not intend to spare him.
We have often seen such a witness surrender at discretion on the first
intimation of such an ordeal. This is one of the arts of advocacy which
cannot be taught by any thing but experience. It is to be learned only
by the language of the eye, the countenance, the tones of the voice, that
betray to the practical observer what is passing in the mind within.'
Here we see a romantic portrait of the trial lawyer as a scientific (almost
Sherlock Holmesian) observer, a psychologist, and a holy terror all rolled
into one. Other writers regale us with instances in which, through the use
of humor or righteous indignation, the advocate strikes like a bolt from
heaven. The witness is humiliated, and in some cases suffers a melt-down.
This is what I will call the Ananias Effect.' Indeed, that old fibber figures
into many a story from simpler, less cosmopolitan days when most everybody
Witness: I never did.
O'Connell: Or write it?
Witness: Never.
Id. The witness was then confronted with just such a letter. Nowadays the prosecution would,
no doubt, attempt to counterattack with a psychologist or social worker or tw wiho would explain
all of this in terms of one or more victim syndromes.
21. See, e.g., RouAR LONGENECKER, SOME HNTS ONThETRIALOFALAwsurr 138 (1927).
Longenecker comments:
A careful and skillful examiner on cross-examination will try mildness and sympathy
with one whom he believes is lying, and lead the witness to believe he is being deceived
by the manner and answers of the witness. The examiner leads him on to add more
and more to the story, a burst of confidence, and a little more light is thrown on the
facts, the examiner is quick to grasp and follow the advantage until finally the witness
is caught.
Id.
22. JAMES RAM, A TREATISE ON FACTS AS SUBJECTS OF INQUIRY BY A JURY 347 (3d Am.
ed. 1873).
23. SeeActs 5:1-10.
1997]
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was reading from the same book. Here is Francis Wellman writing of one
of his own triumphs.
In a Metropolitan Street Railway case a witness whom I had badgered
rather persistently on cross-examination, finally straightened himself
up in the witness chair and said pertly, "I have not come here asking
you to play with me. Do you take me for Anna Held [an actress who sang
a popular song with the lyrics "Won't you come and play with meT']?"
"I was not thinking of Anna Held," I replied quietly; "supposing you
try Ananias!" The witness was enraged, the jury laughed, and I, who
had really made nothing out of the witness up to this time, sat down.'
And here is Percy Foreman,2 reportedly an ordained minister himselt
lowering the boom on a State's witness who made the mistake of testifying
that he had taken a correspondence course in the Scriptures while in the
big house:
Q: Did I understand you to say that you are now a student of the
Holy Writ?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: You mean you are a student of the Bible?
A: That's right.
Q: Have you studied about a character in the Bible by the name
of Ananias?
A: I certainly have. [Lying]
Q: Do you or do you not propose to model your ministry after this
individual?
A: No, sir, I do not. [Faking it]
Q: Who was Ananias?
A: Sir, I will preach you a sermon if you would like to hear one.
Court: We do not want a sermon. Just answer the question.
Q: Tell the jury who Ananias was.
A: At this time, sir, I couldn't tell you. [Oops]
Q: He is the biggest liar in all antiquity. Does that help you?26
It is apparent that we are strolling trough a gallery filled with self-portraits
by members of the professional guild. Seldom does a cross-examination
deliver so much edification and delight. Nor is the typical cross-examination
so destructive. Nor can it be.
24. WELLMAN, supra note 3, at 47.
25. This was before he met James Earl Ray.
26. HELLR, supra note 11, at 22.
27. Nor would the average juror in the 1990's get it-who is this Ananias guy, anyway?
[Vol. 21:113
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H. The Reality of Cross-Examination
I will find
Where truth is hid,
though it were hid indeed
Within the centre.
Polonius s
So you say. But what is the stuff of cross-examination really'?
I have already suggested that when it comes to cross-examination, many
ofus have "unrealistic expectations which have at their root various legends
of the trial bar. For every witness who has been ensnared by a well-conceived
examination, hundreds have escaped, as can be attested to by any trial judge
or practitioner willing to admit the truth."" So even if we assume that
the cross-examiner's principal task were to attack the witness for the purpose
of proving him or her out to be a liar,30 there must be practical limits on
the effectiveness of the average lawyer and his or her technique.
Many lawyers, even experienced trial counsel, have not mastered the
basics of cross-examination. 31 The cross-examiner lets the witness repeat,
and reinforce, the testimony given on direct.' The more aggressive lawyer
is often more offensive than effective, crawling all over the witness like
a cockroach, looking for scraps-meaningless, petty bits and pieces.3
28. WaiAm SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET act 2, sc. 2.
29. WOLF, supra note 11, at xi.
30. Actually,
[tIhe objects of a cross-examination are three in number. The first is to elicit something
in your favor, the second is to weaken the force of what the witness has said against
you; and the third is to show that from his present demeanor or from his past life he
is unworthy of belief, and thus weaken or destroy the effect of his testimony.
HENRY HARDWICKE, THE ART OF WINNING CASES OR MODERN ADVOCACY 152 (1864).
31. See BROWN, supra note 19, at xxx (Foreward by Justice Arnold Guy Fraiman (ret.));
see also J. Alexander Tanford, Keeping Cross-Examination Under Control, 18 AM. . TRIAL
ADVoc. 245 (1994) (offering an excellent primer on the techniques and strategies of cross-
examination). For a recapitulation of the late Professor Irving Younger's "Ten Commandments,"
see Henry Asbill, The Ten Commandments of Cross-Examination Revisited: Should You Sin
to Win When the Case is Criminal?, 8-WTR CRIM. JUST. 2 (1994).
32. BROWN, supra note 19, at xxx.
33. Cf id. at 72 (Avoid Petty Points). On the other hand, one time-honored strategy is to
simply wear everybody down. "If you can succeed in tiring out the witness or in driving him
to the point of sullenness, you have produced the effect of lying." WELLMAN, supra note 3, at
81. But what if you have driven the judge and the jury to the point of sullenness?
1997]
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Or how about skipping around? This is an obvious tactic, and one that
is usually recommended in the literature as a means of exposing a witness
who may be untruthful.'
"make [the witness's] story as he has already told it, and, beginning
where he left off in the direct,... lead him backwards through it, skipping
from point to point to break the chain of association in his mind, giving
him no time to invent or to reflect upon the consequences of his answers,
fixing him to dates, places, names and order of events, and then, after
a few moments of diversion to foreign matters, ... return to these details
and go over them again.""
This can be an effective technique. But there are some other things to
consider. This is not a very good way to tell a story or reinforce a theme.
Furthermore, the cross-examiner may exhaust the patience ofjudge and
jury. One does not get to ask an unlimited number of repetitive questions
(except, perhaps, in California). Finally, "[flor the inexperienced practitioner
it is ... not always advisable to attempt [this technique]. Instead of upsetting
the witness, [counsel] is likely to confuse his own ideas and become lost
in a maze from which he will be unable to extricate himself."'36
Another popular notion is that the dishonest witness "should be examined
rapidly, so that he can have no time to concoct plausible answers between
questions."37 Again, not bad advice in the abstract, but the judge and jury
may think it fair that the witness have a little more time to answer.
Peter Brown's interesting book containing "Thirty Maxims of Cross-
Examination" sets forth the proposition that "Witnesses Sometimes Brain-
wash Themselves."38 He might have noted-in a footnote at least-that
"So Do Lawyers." In my experience, when it comes to cross-examination,
most lawyers are constitutionally incapable of recognizing beforehand that
their brilliant plans and traps will not succeed or convince the factfinder,
and may even backfire. During the execution, they tend to pay lots of atten-
tion to their own questions and posturing, and very little to the witness's
34. See YOUNGER, supra note 17.
35. BAER &BAUCER, supra note 19, at 104; see also WELLMAN, supra note 3, at 67-68,
135-36.
36. BAER & BALICER, supra note 19, at 104.
37. See, e.g., HARDWICKE, supra note 30, at 156.
38. BROWN, supra note 19, at 68.
[Vol. 21:113
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answers and the effect, if any, that those answers are having on the jury.
They convince themselves that they are scoring points. The jurors and the
judge could be asleep or dead. It would not matter. The lawyer would take
no note of it.
Even at that, the destructive cross-examination of witnesses is only part
of the art. The advocate is not a scientific and disinterested truth-seeker,
and the trial is not, in fact, a search for the truth.39 By the time a trial begins,
any searching (for facts, witnesses, documents, etc.) had better be over.
The advocate is first and foremost a seller of a story. The advocate's job
at trial is to fashion and present (within the ethical limits of advocacy) a
version of the truth-the client's version of reality. Whether the witness
is perceived to be an ally, an enemy, or neutral, the cross-examiner should
not pass up the opportunity to use leading questions to draw from the
witness any concession-any bit ofevidence-that will support or corrobo-
rate the client's theory of the case, or contradict that of the opponent.'
The conservative, but no less cunning, cross-examiner will "start off easy"
on the witness and "thus gain his confidence and possibly, some favorable
admissions which might be otherwse withheld if the witness were antago-
nized.""' The quoted advice is from one of my favorite old trial books,
which catalogs the various concessions that may be wrung from plaintiffs
in personal injury cases. 2
Of course, not everyone has the patience or the temperament for a gentle,
subtle approach. Furthermore, in the real world, witnesses are not clay
pigeons. They can move, and some can shoot back. Here, Erle Stanley
39. See Underwood, supra note 12; see also ALLEN HENSON, CONFESSIONS OF A CRIMINAL
LAwYER 41-42 (1959).
[ have] a deep respect for the temper of the crowd back of the bar. One who is able
to gauge it and conform strategy to it, will usually be able to control a case. I learned,
too, that a line of argument which awakens impressions fixed in the minds of jurors
will find ready acceptance. Mark Anthony... captured the mob when at Caesar's funeral
he reminded them, 'I tell you that which you yourselves do know." .... Factors which
move a jury to acquit are many and varied, and chief among them are devices (and these
are many and varied) which take their minds off the evidence.
Id. (emphasis added).
40. On the selling of stories model of the trial, see John Leubsdorf, Stories and Numbers,
13 CARDozo L. REv. 455 (1991); Richard Lempert, Telling Tales in Court: Trial Procedure
and the Story Model, 13 CARDozO L. REv. 559 (1991).
41. LoUis SCHWARTZ, CROSS-EXAMINATION IN PERSONAL INRJRY AcTIoNs 10 (1933).
42. Id.
1997]
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Gardner, the creator of Perry Mason, and an excellent lawyer in his own
right, describes his experiences:
The cross-examiner, trying to be as unfair as possible, looks witheringly
at the witness and says, "Doctor, you expect to be paid for your testimony
in this case, don't youT'... The question was framed so as to show that
the witness expected to be paid for his testimony. . [The question
was deliberately unfair....
But every once in a while a smart one would look me in the eyes and
say, "No!"... and, before I could quite ask the next question, the witness
would say, "I expect to be paid for the time I have spent in research and
for the time I am forced to put in the courtroom. I never take pay for
my testimony." It was then up to me to either ask him about what he
expected to charge for his time, or quit. If I asked him about the value
of his time, the smart witness would smile at me, turn to the jurors and
explain that his time had to include his overhead, the cost of maintaining
his office, his books, his telephone, his secretary, the purchase of new
machines or instruments, and the purchase of new books. . . . I was, of
course, at liberty to stop him and I had to stop him because with every
word he was selling himself to thejury. But when I stopped him the jurors
felt as though I had jerked the magazine out of their hands .... I
"The sympathies of the jury are invariably on the side of the witness, and
they are quick to resent any discourtesy toward him. They are willing to
admit his mistakes, if you can make them apparent, but are slow to believe
him guilty of perjury.""
43. Confessions ofA Cross-EAmniner, in SARA ROBBINS, LAW: A TREASURY OF ART AND
LTERAIURE 314-15 (1990) (this exerpt is from a speech deliveredin 1957 to the American Academy
of Forensic Sciences). For guidance insofar as attacks on medical witnesses are concerned, see
Scott v. Spanger Bros., 298 F.2d 928, 931 (2d Cir. 1962) (questioning whether evidence that
an expert has a reputation as a plaintiff's witness is sufficient to disqualify him as an expert
witness4, Timpte v. District Court, 421 P.2d 728, 729 (Colo. 1966) (analyzing whether defendant
may be denied the right to have plaintiff examined by a doctor of his choosing); Campbell v.
Wilson, 239 S.E.2d 546 (Ga. Ct. App. 1977) (questioning whether an expert witness's expulsion
from county medical society is proper inquiry for cross examination); Mezzanotte Constr. Co.
v. Gibbons, 148 A2d 399 (Md. 1959) (examining whether a trial judge erred in refusing to allow
inquiry on cross examination of plaintiff's expert concerning compensation paid to expert for
testifying and whether this error was sufficient to constitute reversible eror)4 Janus v. Hackensack
Hosp., 330 A.2d 628, 630-31 (N.J. Super. 1974) (discussing whether a trial judge may prevent
inquiry on cross examination as to the number of times an expert has testified in malpractice
casesX) Lawlor v. Kolarsick, 223 A.2d 281 (N.J. Super. CL App. Div. 1966) (holding that proper
inquiry on cross may be made into expert witness's varied and eccentric literary undertakings
to show expert had little time for medical practice); Virginia Linen Serv. v. Allen, 96 S.E.2d
86, 91 (Va. 1957) (discussing whether a judgment may be set aside based on after-discovered
evidence of a relationship between plaintiff's attorney and plaintiff's expert witness).
44. WELLMAN, supra note 3, at 30.
[Vol. 21:113
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Finally, the painful reality is that not every false witness will be identified
as such, let alone defeated. Such are the limits of cross-examination.
More cases have been lost than won by belaboring witnesses on cross-
examination. Lawyers are constantly publishing works on the art of cross-
examination. When I read them I muse in reflection: "Brother, you might
write a classic on this art, but if you are to win your tough cases you had
best toss your book out the window and learn the art of direct
examination.""
III. The Ethics of Cross-Examination
Also troubling is the possibility that a truthful witness might be targeted
and ruined by a clever cross-examiner,' or that a cross-examination will
have little or nothing to do with the witness, and serve only as an orifice
through which inadmissible and prejudicial matter is injected.
Some years ago I wrote an article in which I attempted to collect some
of the standard dirty tricks of advocacy.4' Through the wondrous process
of academic cold fusion this little piece grew into two books." Of course,
my offerings were well intended. Like the unknown author of Rhetorica
AdHerennium, 9 I meant to warn practicing lawyers away from sin, and
at the same time teach my students how to spot and avoid illegal blows,
counterpunch, and move on. However, there is reason to believe that these
mental cartridges misfired. In my experience,' the few lawyers that have
actually consulted such works seem to have done so with evil in their hearts."'
45. HENSEN, supra note 39, at 180.
46. See Robert P. Lawry, Cross-Emining the Truthful Witness: The Ideal Within the Central
Moral Tradition ofLawyering, 100 DICK. L. REV. 563 (1996).
47. Richard Underwood, Adversary Ethics: More Dirty Tricks, 6 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC.
265 (1982).
48. RIcHARDUNDERWOOD&W.JJAMFORTUNE,TIALETICS(1988); WILWHA FoRTUNE
ET AL, MODERN LITIGAION AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBRLrY HANDBOOK: THE LIMs OF
ZEALOUS ADVOCACY (1996).
49. Underwood, supra note 12, at 597,602 (discussing this and other venerable works on
the black arts of advocacy).
50. I have been a Bar Association Ethics Chairman for almost 15 years.
51. I suspect that the record one-day sale of TRiAL ETHIcs came when our library replaced
its five or six copies, which had been stolen. This provided me with a few bucks and a pretty
good character and fitness anecdote.
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Some wanted to find a few new dirty tricks that they had not yet tried.
Others were looking for a way to sidetrack matters into ethics inquiries
regarding the propriety of their opponents' trial tactics so that they could
avoid falling back on the merits of their claim or defense.52 I admit that
at least some of the professional literature has begun to acknowledge the
excesses of the system.5 3 But when it comes to apology, the sentiment
has not been so much in the direction of regret as it has been in the direction
of defense of prevailing practices.'
Indulge me while I run through a mini-restatement of some all-too-
commonly-employed tricks of the trade, which hardly spark the engine
of any "truth machine."
1. Cross-examination by innuendo is the most common offense. Within
the realm of innuendo, the lawyer has no good faith basis for asking a
question that is suggestive of improper conduct by the witness. The lawyer
52. Still, a few similarly well intended articles followed my original offering. See, e.g.,
Philip H. Corboy, Cross-Examination: Walking the Line Between ProperPrejudice and Unethical
Conduct, 10 ANL 3. TRIALADVOc. 1 (1986). And I was hardly the first latter day law professor
writing in the tradition of RHETORICA AD HERENNiUM. See James McElhaney, Dealing With
Dirty Tricks, 7 LrrlG. 45 (1981).
53. Gordon Van Kessel, Adversary Excesses in the American Criminal Trial, 67 NOTRE
DAME L. REv. 403 (1992). Van Kessel states:
[Truth-finding over the past few decades has been subordinated to a number of other
values, often in situations where the reasons for sacrificing truth appear more speculative
than compelling... Few would contend that truth is always an objective which, like.
a scientific principle or an ancient ruin, is waiting to be discovered and verified. But
most judges and lawyers would agree that the centrl issues in the great bulk of criminal
cases involve the determination of historical facts.
Id. at 451, 457 (emphasis added); see also Lawry, supra note 46, at 563.
54. See, e.g., Eva Nilsen, The Criminal Defense Lawyer's Reliance on Bias and Prejudice,
8 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHics 1, 5 (1994) ("This article argues against [proposed rules aimed at
eliminating lawyer's use of bias] because they impinge on legitimate lawyering, and they may
distract the bar from the more serious ethical problem of underzealousness, particularly in the
representation of poor people."); Corboy, supra note 52. Corboy observes:
Truth, as an absolute, is an incidental ftnction of the adversary process .... [A] lawyer
may effectively employ trial skills and tactics that make a witness appear unreliable,
although that countenance stems more from the artifice of counsel's skillful questions
than any discomfiting revelations by the witness .... Out of the process of destruction
on cross-examination, the truth, as spoken, is whittled .... -From this dialectic, a terrible
beauty is born; it is called justice.
Corboy, supra note 52, at 5, 13. Did the "O.J." trial ruin this for us?
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simply invents an outrageous scenario and presents it to the jury by way
of question. The fact that there is no actual evidentiary basis for such a
question proves to be of little importance."
2. Another example is impeachment by evidence that does not satisfy
the rules. For example, reference to arrests,' marital infidelities,"' or other
embarrassing misdeeds or delicts, real or imagined do not satisfy the rules.
3. The prosecutor may also inject other acts evidence for which there
is no factual basis. During a prosecution charging defendant with being
a bomb-maker:
Q: You said that occasionally Charles Lowe may refer to you as Pigface?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Are you the same Pigface that he had go into the Hobby Shop and buy
some remote control devices for him?'
There was no evidence to support the suggestion that this had ever happened.
4. A common variant asks the witness being cross-examined to assume
that the defendant has committed some reprehensible or loathsome deed,
and then asks if that would change the witness's mind about the defendant's
reputation, or change the witness's opinion of defendant's character. 59
5. Manipulative questioning that lays the foundation for the admission
of otherwise inadmissible evidence for a limited purpose, which limitation
may be conveniently forgotten when the time comes for summation.'
6. Also notable is the injection of inadmissible data or reports under
the guise of impeachment of the opponent's expert witness.6
55. See Kiefel v. Las Vegas Hacienda, Inc., 39 F.RD. 592 (N.D. 111. 1966), affid, 404 F.2d
1163 (7th Cir. 1968) (resulting in a mistrial and monetary sanctions).
56. See Hawk v. Superior Court, 42 Cal. App. 3d 108, 116 Cal. Rptr. 713 (1974).
57. See Harmon v. Commonwealth, 898 S.W.2d 486 (Ky. 1995).
58. United States v. Liesure, 844 F.2d 1347, 1362 (8th Cir. 1988).
59. See, e.g., United States v. Mason, 993 F.2d 406, 407 (4th Cir. 1993); United States
v. Oshatz, 912 F.2d 534, 536 (2d Cir. 1990) United States v. Siers, 873 F.2d 747, 748 (4th Cir.
1989).
60. See, e.g., Daggett v. Atchison, Topka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 48 Cal. 2d 655, 669, 313
P.2d 557, 560 (1957); Croley v. Huddleston, 301 Ky. 580, 584, 192 S.W.2d 717, 720 (1946)
(indicating the propriety of a summation that disregards an earlier limiting instruction).
61. Cf. Polythane Systems, Inc. v. Marina Ventures Int'l, Ltd., 993 F.2d 1201, 1207 (5th
Cir. 1993) (finding that testifying expert's reliance on report of nontestifying expert did not make
nontestifying expert's report admissible).
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7. Cross-examination that involves lying to the witness, to set the witness
up for a fall is yet another trick employed.62
8. Outright abuse of the witness, or harassment and humiliation for its
own sake is also problematic.'
9. Perhaps the most extreme abuse of cross-examination is the calling
of a witness solely for the purpose of impeaching that witness. This is
referred to as "impeachment as a subterfuge." This is used by prosecutors
to inject guilt by association.65 It has also been employed, rather crudely,
as a vehicle for bias incitement in civil cases. In Arnoldt v. Ashland Oil,
Inc.," an obliging trial judge permitted the plaintiffs to call the CEO of
the defendant corporation as an adverse witness, as if on cross, introduce
a letter "referencing Ashland's long history as a responsible corporate
citizen ' and then impeach him with corporate acts unrelated to the issues
before the court but inconsistent with good corporate citizenship. Fortu-
nately, the overreaching lawyers were rewarded with a reversal.68
IV. Summing Up
[Mr. Mark Twain] ... he told the truth, mainly. There was things which
he stretched, but mainly he told the truth. That is nothing. I never seen
anybody but lied one time or another, without it was Aunt Polly, or the
widow, or maybe Mary.69
I have ended, only to begin again; but that actually makes some sense.
When preparing a case, the wise lawyer begins at the end, with the jury
charges that the judge is likely to give. Prepare the closing argument you
62. See, e.g., Kiner v. State, 643 N.E.2d 950, 956 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994); In re Metzger, 31
Haw. 929, 932 (1931).
63. See United States v. Dowdy, 960 F.2d 78 (8th Cir. 1992).
64. Don Johnsen, Impeachment With an Unswm P'orInconsistentStatementas Subterfuge,
28 WM. &MARY L. REV. 295, 298 (1987).
65. See United States v. Fleetwood, 528 F.2d 528, 530 (5th Cir. 1976) (involving a prosecutor
who called a former codefendant and attempted to impeach him by alluding to his earlier guilty
plea).
66. 186 W. Va. 394, 412 S.E.2d 795 (1991).
67. Arnoldt, 412 S.E.2d at 809.
68. Id. at 814.
69. MARKTWAIN, THE ADVENTURES oFHUcKLEBERRYFINNat (Holt, Rinehard & Winston,
Inc. 1948) (1881).
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would like to make, and build toward it. What cross-examination will
advance your theory of the case?
Consider the jury charges that the judge will give concerning the credibility
of witnesses. But again, do not bet everything on cross. Here is a special
charge on the character and credibility of the complaining witness, taken
from the "summing up" delivered by His Honor the Judge (Sir Joseph
Cantley) in the wacky trial for conspiracy to murder of Mr. Jeremy Thorpe
in the Old Bailey in 1979:
"[A]t one time [he] was suspected of stealing silver from a house where
he was living in Dublin, although he denied this. He is a crook. ....
He is a fraud, he is a sponger. He is a whiner. He is a parasite. But,
of course, he could still be telling the truth. It is a question of belief.
... I am not expressing any opinion."7
u
Mr. Thorpe, a member of Her Majesty's Privy Council, was acquitted.
Could there have been any other result?
In America, federal judges retain the power of the British judge to
comment on the evidence--to sum up for the jury, and to give elaborate
instructions. However, most federal judges are, well, judicious when it
comes to exercising these particular muscles. In many states the judge
may not comment on the evidence, and even jury instructions are limited
to the bare bones.7 1 It is unlikely that you will encounter the likes of His
Honor Sir Joseph Donaldson Cantley in your neck of the woods. Still,
American judges do give instructions regarding the credibility of witnesses.
Basically, they outline the more obvious avenues of cross-examination.
One pattern jury charge in the Sixth (federal) Circuit goes like this:
Another part of your job as jurors is to decide how credible or believable
each witness was. This is your job, not mine. It is up to you to decide
if a witness's testimony was believable, and how much weight you think
it deserves. You are free to believe everything that a witness said, or
only part of it, or none at all. But you should act reasonably and carefully
in making these decisions. Let me suggest some things for you to consider
in evaluating each witness's testimony.
70. AUBERONWAUGH, THELASTWORD:ANEYEwrINESAcCouNTOFTHETRALOFJERwY
THORPE 224-25 (1980) (emphasis added).
71. In my home state ofKentucky, instructions which comment on the testimony are improper,
as are instructions which give the jurors rules to employ in evaluating the credibility of witnesses!
See 1 WILIAM COoPER, KENTUCKY INSTRUCTONS TO JURIEs 21-22 (1993).
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(A) Ask yourself if the witness was able to clearly see or hear the
events. Sometimes even an honest witness may not have been
able to see or hear what was happening, and may make a mistake.
(B) Ask yourself how good the witness's memory seemed to be. Did
the witness seem able to accurately remember what happened?
(C) Ask yourself if there was anything else that may have interfered
with the witness's ability to perceive or remember the events.
(D) Ask yourself how the witness acted while testifying. Did the
witness appear honest? Or did the witness appear to be lying?
(E) Ask yourself if the witness had any relationship to the government
or the defendant, or anything to gain or lose from the case, that
might influence the witness's testimony. Ask yourself ifthe witness
had any bias, or prejudice, or reason for testifying that might cause
the witness to lie or to slant the testimony in favor of one side
or the other.
(F) Ask yourself if the witness testified inconsistently while on the
witness stand, or if the witness said or did something [or failed
to say or do something] at any other time that is inconsistent with
what the witness said while testifying. If you believe that the
witness was inconsistent, ask yourself if this makes the witness's
testimony less believable. Sometimes it may; other times it may
not. Consider whether the inconsistency was about something
important, or about some unimportant detail. Ask yourself if it
seemed like an innocent mistake, or if it seemed deliberate.
(G) And ask yourself how believable the witness's testimony was in
light of all the other evidence. Was the witness's testimony
supported or contradicted by other evidence that you found believ-
able? If you believe that a witness's testimony was contradicted
by other evidence, remember that people sometimes forget things,
and that even two honest people who witness the same event may
not describe it exactly the same way.'
One of the more interesting points made in these instructions is the notion
that inconsistency does not necessarily rule out believability. On the other
hand, it is also common for a judge to tell the jury that
ifa person is shown to have knowingly testified falsely concerning any
important or material fact, [then the jurors] obviously have a right to
distrust the testimony of such an individual concerning other matters.
[The jurors are permitted, but not required, to] reject all of the testimony
72. EDWARD DEvrrT ET AL., CgEDDlLrrY OF WrrssEs ch. 15 (1990) (offering this and
additional charges for every federal occasion); see Underwood, supra note 12, at 597 (offering
more on demeanor evidence).
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of that witness or give it such weight or credibility as [the jurors] may
think it deserves. 73
This instruction reflects the notion that a permissible and negative inference
about the witness's credibility may be drawn when the witness lies on any
point. The jury may decide that if the witness is false in one thing, then
the witness is false in all things-falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus.
A related question is whether an admitted or convicted perjurer can
be believed? In fact and in law, a perjurer's testimony is admissible. We
no longer bar convicted perjurer's from taking the witness stand.74 But
a standard jury charge informs the jury that "the testimony of a perjurer
should always be considered with caution and weighed with great care.",
7 5
Lawyers and lawyer-watchers seem to think that the logic of these charges
is compelling, and that jurors are greatly influenced by them.7 6 Catch
somebody fibbing on one little thing and the whole case is in your pocket.
Maybe so, and maybe not. My advice is: Don't bet the whole farm on
it.
73. DEvrrr ET AL., supra note 72, § 15.06. This instruction is improper in a few states
like Kentucky! See COOPER, supra note 71, at 22.
74. For the practice in the good old days of Merry Old England see The [Pejury] Statute
of 1563, which provided for imprisonment, fine, the pillory, the "nailing" of the ears, and exile
from the witness stand; in the United States the Act of April 30, 1790, section 18 provided for
imprisonment, fine, an hour in the pillory but no ear "nailing," and exile from the witness stand
in any court of the United states. Richard Underwood, False Witness: A Lawyer's History of
the Law ofPeriury, 10 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 215, 241-42, 246-47 (1993).
75. DEVrrTETAL.,supranote72, § 15.10.
76. See, e.g., STEPHIENJ.ADLER THE JUR. TRIALANDERRoRINTEAMERICANCOuRTROOM
188,192 (1994). Cf Knapp v. State, 79 N.E. 1076, 1077 (hId. 1907) ("One of the first principles
of human nature is the impulse to speak the truth. 'This principle... has a powerful operation,
even in the greatest liars; for where they lie once, they speak the truth 100 times."').
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